Anlamın mantığı'nı bir psikolojik roman olarak Okumak: Gilles Deleuze'ün Lewis Carroll'la maceraları by Demir Atay, Hivren
Reading The Logic of Sense as a Psychological Novel: … 







Reading The Logic of Sense as a Psychological Novel:  
Gilles Deleuze's Adventure with Lewis Carroll 
 
Abstract 
The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's intense engagement with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in The Logic of Sense is frequently problematized as an 
inconsistent phase in his thought. This article argues that the relationship between 
the series and the events that Deleuze builds in this book highlights it as a 
coherent part of his philosophical project. By concentrating on Deleuze's reading 
of the English writer Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, the article 
suggests that similar to Alice's “telescope body,” the series of The Logic of Sense 
include movements of opening and shutting up in the events that create their 
effects through the differences in the signifying chain. These differences stem 
from an encounter of the homogeneous and heterogeneous series, which finds a 
reflection in Deleuze's relationship with psychoanalysis. His inevitable 
“encounter” with Lacan or more generally his “adventure” with psychoanalysis 




Deleuze, Carroll, Lacan, Psychoanalysis, Event, Series. 
 
Anlamın Mantığı’nı Bir Psikolojik Roman Olarak Okumak: 
Gilles Deleuze’ün Lewis Carroll’la Maceraları 
 
Özet 
Fransız filozof Gilles Deleuze'ün The Logic of Sense kitabında psikanalizle 
kurduğu yoğun ilişki,  Deleuze düşüncesi içinde tutarsız bir aşama olarak sıklıkla 
sorunsallaştırılmıştır. Bu makale, söz konusu kitapta diziler ve olaylar arasında 
kurulan ilişkinin, kitabı, Deleuze'ün felsefi projesinin anlamlı bir parçası olarak 
belirginleştirdiğini ileri sürmektedir. Makale, Deleuze'ün İngiliz yazar Lewis 
Carroll'ın Alice Harikalar Diyarında adlı masalı üzerine yaptığı yorumlara 
odaklanarak, The Logic of Sense'in, tıpkı Alice'in “teleskop bedeni” gibi, etkisini, 
gösterenler zincirinde ortaya çıkan farklar yoluyla yaratan olaylar içindeki açılma 
ve kapanma hareketleri içerdiğini öne sürmektedir. Bu farklar homojen ve 
heterojen serilerin karşılaşmasından kaynaklanırken, Deleuze'ün Lacan'la 
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karşılaşmasında da bir yansımasını bulmaktadır. Deleuze'ün Lacan'la kaçınılmaz 
“karşılaşması” ya da daha genel olarak psikanalizle “macerası,” “farklı” bir 
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1. Introduction 
The Logic of Sense, which was first published in 1969, is often singled out in 
Gilles Deleuze's ouevre as his most structuralist book that contadicts with his 
philosophy or creates an impasse in his critical thought. It is not only because the book 
engages with the psychoanalytic concepts, but also because the structure of the book 
itself mirrors the structure of the signifying chain as theorized by Jacques Lacan. 
Tracing the logic of sense, Deleuze divides his book into thirty four series in which he 
reads Lewis Carroll's fairy tale, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, along with numerous 
other literary works extending from Jorge Luis Borges's Ficciones to Scott Fitzgerald's 
The Crack Up. While the profound psychoanalytic content of Alice's Adventures as well 
as the prevalence of its psychoanalytic analyses draw the frame of reference for 
Deleuze, the Lacanian discourse of The Logic of Sense seems to confound the 
commentators. When Jean-Jacques Lecercles welcomes James Williams's critical guide 
to The Logic of Sense as an answer to the “unjust critical doxa” that considers it “the 
work of a structuralist Deleuze, still under the influence of Lacan and psychoanalysis” 
(2008: vii), he underlines the inseparability of this book from Deleuze's philosophical 
project. In fact, Williams suggests that Deleuze's philosophy of events does not 
contradict with the structures and series that he studies and adopts in The Logic of 
Sense. “Events introduce change and differences within those structures,” he maintains, 
“thus the event of a variation in a social practice draws a society out of line with known 
and expected patterns; it introduces difference and novelty” (a.e., 1).  This article is a 
modest attempt to discuss the relationship between the series and events, to which 
Williams draws attention, with a focus on Deleuze's reading of Alice's Adventures. 
Since Deleuze's Lacanian stance is problematized here, the article delves into Deleuze's 
description of The Logic of Sense as “an attempt to develop a logical and psychological 
novel” (1990: xiv). Thus the basic question to be posed will be:  How can a 
psychoanalytic perspective deal with the logical aspect of this psychological novel? 
 
2. The Telescope Body of The Logic of Sense  
The logic of Deleuze's book may first be traced in the “surface effects” of the 
very body of the text. Similar to Alice's body in Carroll's tale it opens and shuts up like 
a “telescope.” The telescope movement points to the simultaneity of the possibility and 
the impossibility of “making sense,” creating series, paradoxes, effects, and events. It is 
this simultaneity that places the movements of opening and shutting up in the events 
which create the surface effects of the series. On the one hand The Logic of Sense 
Reading The Logic of Sense as a Psychological Novel: … 




progresses through a chain of series, but on the other hand it shuts itself up by avoiding 
to attach each series in a manner that explicates or deepens the conceptual framework of 
the preceeding series. The logic here may be formulated with a reference to Alice's 
expression of her intention to write a fairy tale: “. . .when I grow up, I‟ll write one – but 
I‟m grown up now” (Carroll 2001: 61). The series are attached to each other and thus 
defer “making sense,” but the book does not promise a coherent unraveling. In other 
words, while each series is “grown up now,” “making sense” is deferrred by the 
presence of the chain of series. 
The series that constitute the chapters of The Logic of Sense illustrate that events 
“haunt” language both by inhering in it and exceeding the mere expression (Deleuze 
1990: 181).  The event, which is neither the denotation nor the signification, occurs in a 
chain of series, but this occurance also proves to be the condition and the foundation of 
language. In other words,  it is the event that renders language possible rather than the 
denotation and the signification. If “without the event all of this would be only noise” 
(a.e., 182), it is because language moves beyond the corporeal sound effect by 
separating itself from the body. The event, then, has an essence of “an impassible 
incorporeal entity” (a.e.). The impassibility of this essence may be translated as the 
surface effect of an event that enables it to happen. The telescope bodies of both Alice 
and The Logic of Sense point to these impassible entities by presenting their presence in 
a movement that transforms their corporial bodies. As Williams underscores, Deleuzian 
events are neither new occurances with a new beginning nor new entities that have not 
been existed before (2008: 2). Thus a beginning should be understood “as a novel 
selection in ongoing and continually altering series” (a.e.). Williams's suggestion may 
well be utilized as a guide for understanding both the textual body of The Logic of Sense 
and the place of this book in Deleuze's thought. Consequently, one may suggest, each 
series of the book as well as the book itself represents a “novel selection” in the 
signifying chain. 
The signifying chain, in Lacan's terms, implies the movement of a Deleuzian 
event. Since the shifts in the signifying chain include a transformation that is based on 
the new encounters in altering series, the simultaneity of the possibility and the 
impossibility of making sense is intrinsic to the movement of the signifiers in the 
signifying chain. “The play of sense and non-sense,” as Deleuze calls it, manifests itself 
in this simultaneity, finding an expression in Alice's “telescope body.” Her utopic wish 
to shut up like a telescope alludes to an impossibility which is neutralized by the recent 
unusual occurences: “[S]o many out-of-the-way things had happened lately, that Alice 
had begun to think that very few things indeed were really impossible” (Carroll 2001: 
41). Eventually, the impossibility of one‟s shutting up like a telescope does not erase the 
possibility of Alice‟s shutting up like a telescope. Among the recent “out-of-the-way-
things” Alice‟s wish makes sense and finds a place in her logic. Her wish is indeed a 
result of her logical inference which we read when Alice notices a small passage like a 
rat-hole, through which she sees a charming garden: “[S]he could not even get her head 
through the doorway; „and even if my head would go through,‟ thought poor Alice, „it 
would be of very little use without my shoulders‟” (a.e.). Alice‟s unique way of thinking 
here shows us another “out-of-the-way-thing”: She conceives her head and shoulders as 
separate bodies even though her head is of very little use without her shoulders. 
According to Deleuze, Lewis Carroll‟s works offer a series of paradoxes through “a 
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play of sense and nonsense” (1990: xiii). Instead of making a “daisy chain,” Alice finds 
herself in a play where there is no determinable direction (Carroll 2001: 37). Therefore, 
Alice‟s shutting up brings about the possibility of her openning at the same time as she 
wishes to shut up like a telescope. According to Deleuze, the simultaneity of becoming 
here eludes the present as Alice becomes larger than she was and becomes smaller than 
she is. In terms of Platonic dualism this is “a pure becoming,” which Deleuze calls, “the 
paradox of infinite identity” (1990: 2).    
Thus if Alice‟s head would be of “very little use” without her shoulders, the 
language creates a paradox, meaning on the one hand it would be “of use,” but on the 
other hand it would be “of very little use.” Alice‟s body (or bodies) appears not as a 
thing but as an event, non-existing and subsisting. For that reason, Alice would knock 
the door in “Pig and Pepper,” although she and the Frog-Footman are on the same side 
of the door: “„There might be some sense in your knocking,‟ the Footman went on 
without attending to her, „if we had the door between us. For instance, if you were 
inside, you might knock, and I could let you out, you know‟” (Carroll 2001: 81). Alice 
knocks the door because her body does not exist but inheres, thereby eluding both the 
present and the presence. Hence, Deleuze‟s description of paradox as “initially that 
which destroys good sense as the only direction, but [. . .] also that which destroys 
common sense as the assignation of fixed identities” (1990: 3) may be reformulated: 
Alice grows and Alice grows simultaneously. Alice cannot be in-side since there is no 
direction (side) and no depth (in). 
Deleuze, referring to the Stoics‟ discovery of the surface effects, maintains that 
“The most concealed becomes the most manifest” (1990: 8) and “Paradox appears as a 
dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language 
along this limit” (a.e., 9). Events are now on the edges rather than being behind the 
curtains or underground. Reversing the sides would only mean changing the directions, 
as in the case of a left-handed person. When the caterpillar tells Alice that “One side [of 
the mushroom] will make you grow taller and the other side will make you grow 
shorter” (Carroll 2001: 75), the directions are even completely dismissed: “Alice 
remained looking thoughtfully at the mushroom for a minute, trying to make out which 
were the two sides of it; and as it was perfectly round, she found this a very difficult 
question. However, at last she stretched her arms round it as far as they would go, and 
broke off a bit of the edge with each hand” (a.e.). After this act Alice has to ask the 
question, “which is which?” (a.e.).  This question relates not only to the sides of the 
mushroom but also to her own identity because one side makes her smaller and the 
other side makes her larger: which is which side and which is which Alice? 
Before the question of “which is which”, however, Alice asks the question of 
“what?”: “„On the side of what? The other side of what?‟ thought Alice to herself” 
(a.e.). Alice asks the question of what not because she does not understand that one side 
denotes one side of the  mushroom, but because she does not comprehend its 
expression, i.e., its sense. Therefore she sees the mushroom, yet she looks again and 
sees its effect. Mushroom as an effect, then, creates a gap between the word 
“mushroom” and what Alice sees at the second glance. The signifiers and the signifieds 
begin to float. When Alice grows, the outcome is a series of Alice –big Alice, small 
Alice, short Alice, tall Alice- so we have an Alice-chain similar to a daisy-chain, but 
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when Alice grows we lose Alice‟s name since Alice grows only at the present time 
which is eluded by her growing or regressing. The consequence of this movement is a 
series of floated signifiers and signifieds, each of which corresponds to a particular 
event or singularity. The signifier then does not signify the signified. Alice‟s regression 
has a serial form in which “each denoting name has a sense which must be denoted by 
another name” (Deleuze 1990: 36). The issue, however, is also of expression in addition 
to denotation, since the sense serves for denoting the following name in the series. 
Viewing the problem of the series and events from a Lacanian perspective, Deleuze 
posits difference in the series, i.e, what changes in the succession. In his own account, 
“Every unique series, whose homogeneous terms are distinguished only according to 
type or degree, necessarily subsumes under it two heterogeneous series, each one of 
which is constituted by terms of the same type or degree, although these terms differ in 
nature from those of the other series (they can of course differ also in degree)” (a.e., 36, 
37). The notion of difference placed in the signifying chain, then, adds a movement to 
signification, rendering the encounters of the homogenous and heterogenous series 
“events.” This encounter occurs in a crossroads where language is deployed in its limits 
to make sense on the surfaces.   
 
3. Alice's Esoteric Language of the Surface 
Reflecting on the nature of this encounter and its surface effects, Deleuze 
furthers his engagement with Lacanian psychoanalysis. This engagement leads Slavoj 
Žižek to ask, “How, then, are we to read his later obvious 'hardening' of the stance 
toward 'structuralism?'” (2004: 82). While the question comes from a Lacanian 
perspective, one needs to remember that Lacan himself may not be as structuralist as he 
is often thought of. According to Žižek, it may be inappropriate to regard Deleuze's 
engagement with structuralism as belongig to an epoch that was going to be buried with 
his “hardening” of his structuralist stance. It may rather be a “false line of flight,” Žižek 
speculates, or an escape from the complexity of the structuralist thought: That is why 
his collaboration with Guattari might be a “relief” for Deleuze (a.e., 82, 83). Although it 
is not easy to comment on the relationship between the two philosophers who develop 
their thought in changing phases through their own concepts, Žižek's emphasis on their 
encounter is particularly striking for a discussion on a passionate reader like Deleuze. If 
“an encounter is not a dialogue” (a.e., xi), it is because compatibility is not a 
requirement for the former. To put it in Žižek's Lacanian terminology, “An encounter 
cannot be reduced to symbolic exchange: what resonates in it, over and above the 
symbolic exchange, is the echo of a traumatic impact” (a.e.). This traumatic impact 
implicates a contamination intrinsic to the problem of reading. Moving in a frame of 
reference, a reader may find himself / herself in such a contamination or in Roland 
Barthes's terms, in a “desperate plagiarism” (1992: 22). That is to suggest that the 
critical traditions constitute a signifying chain in which what matters is the “difference” 
that stems from the traumatic repetitions. Thus Deleuze's encounter with Lacan may 
well be considered an event that brings about a different thought eventually. In this 
process The Logic of Sense “occurs” on the surface and thus creates the surface effects 
in the signifying chain of Deleuze's thought.  
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While conceptualizing the surface effects through an engagement with Lacan's 
reading of Edgar Allan Poe's “The Purloined Letter,” Deleuze unwittingly pinpoints the 
place of The Logic of Sense in his oeuvre. In other words, his exploration of the logic of 
sense in the series does not exclude his adventure with philosophical and literary 
traditions. Deleuze, Lacan, Poe, and Carroll meet here, in this adventure, where 
compatibility and dialogue leave their place to an inescapable contamination. “The bad 
psychoanalysis,” as he coins the term, proves to be the crossroads in which the 
homogenous and heterogenous series converge to let the events happen in the limits of 
language. 
Reading Lacan‟s seminar on “The Purloined Letter,” Deleuze underscores the 
difference between the series. The similarity of the two scenes -the first in the royal 
boudoir and the second in the Minister‟s office- as well as the structural resemblance of 
the three moments of glances leads Lacan to theorize the displacement of the subject in 
the signifying chain. Tracing the nature of this displacement, Lacan concludes that the 
subject is constituted in the symbolic register. Since the itenarary of the purloined letter 
rather than its content determines the subject's place in the signifying chain, Lacan 
designates the letter as a pure signifier. By bringing forward the insistence of the pure 
signifier in the signifying chain, Lacan aims to show that the subject is constructed in 
and as an effect of language. Drawing on Lacan's seminar, Deleuze suggests that if the 
characters in “The Purloined Letter” -the Police, the Minister, the royal personage, and 
Dupin- act according to the place of the letter, the lack of correspondance here may be 
regarded as an essential component of the series for enabling their continuity. Since the 
heterogeneity of the series, which is facilitated by the difference that the letter's location 
makes, relates the subject's relationship with langauge, Deleuze attaches Lacan's reading 
of the story to Alice's Adventures in his search for the logic of sense. 
The logic of sense is guided by the interference of this heterogenity to the 
homogenous series, as a result of which the register of truth leaves its place to that of 
surfaces. The content of the letter as well as the mystery that the detective genre relies 
on proves inconsequential compared to the simplicity of the case. It is this simplicity 
rather than the depth of the case that the Police misses. While Dupin finds the letter on 
the surface, the story demonstrates to Lacan that the register of truth resides in 
intersubjectivity. This register, Lacan maintains, is a real delusion because everything 
except the simplicity and the oddity of the story makes us believe the imbecility of the 
Prefect and draws our attention to the mystery. The simplicity and oddity of the case, on 
the other hand, shows the singularity of the letter. Lacan poses the singularity of the 
letter as the “true subject” of the story, which, according to him, illustrates the meaning 
insisting in the signifying chain. Based on its insisting nature, Deleuze calls the letter “a 
paradoxical entity” (1990: 40) for being single folded and having two sides. As the 
circulation of the letter is provided through dis-placements, it is never where it is. 
Quoting Lacan, Deleuze suggests, “it fails to observe its place (elle manque à sa place)” 
(a.e., 41). In fact, Lacan describes the letter as a signifier, which  is “by nature symbol 
only of an absence” (1987: 39). Therefore, Lacan goes on, it does not have a proper 
place, but it is dis-placed in the signifying chain remaining constantly “in sufferance” 
with the language of the post office (a.e., 43).  
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According to Deleuze this kind of sufferance and its heterogenous nature is 
preserved by the esoteric word in Lewis Carroll‟s work. The structure is constituted by 
at least two heterogeneous series –signifying and signified- and each of these series is 
constituted by the terms existing through their relations with each other.  In the 
structure, particular events, i.e., singularities correspond to these relations (Deleuze 
1990: 50). Therefore, the paradoxical element is a “differentiator” toward which two 
heterogeneous series converge: 
This element belongs to no series; or rather, it belongs to both series at once and 
never ceases to circulate throughout them. It has therefore the property of always 
being displaced in relation to itself, “of being absent from its own place,” its own 
identity, its own resemblance, and its own equilibrium. It appears in one of the 
series as an excess, but only on the condition that it would appear at the same time 
in the other as a lack. But if it is in excess in the one, it is only as an empty square; 
and if it is lacking in the other, it is so only as a supernumerary pawn or an 
occupant without a compartment. It is both word and object at once: esoteric word 
and exoteric object.  (a.e., 51) 
Thus the paradoxical element, the esoteric word in that case, denotes what it 
expresses while expressing its denotation. It simultanously says something and the 
sense of what it is saying. In the serial form, however, the name saying its own sense 
should be nonsense. Nonsense is present in the sense (a.e., 67).  When Alice begins to 
open out like the largest telescope ever, her feet become almost out of sight. She plans 
to send them a new pair of shoes: “„They must go by the carrier,‟ she thought; „and how 
funny it‟ll seem, sending presents to one‟s own feet! And how odd the directions will 
look! Alice‟s Right Foot, Esq., Hearthrug, near the Fender (with Alice‟s love)‟”.  Then 
Alice exclaims, “Oh dear, what nonsense I‟m talking!” (Carroll 2001: 45)  Although 
Alice realizes the nonsense when she discerns that her feet are the parts of her body, she 
initially imagines her feet as separate entities. By denoting the nonsense, nonetheless, 
Alice renders the nonsense sense, or she herself makes sense. Through denotation, 
nonsense begins to make sense. In the esoteric word, on the other hand, nonsense 
inhabits in sense without denoting it. However, Deleuze adds, nonsense may encompass 
different abysses whose surface is fragile enough to approach the language of a little 
girl, an artist, or a schizophrenic in the same manner (1990: 92). Moving from the 
surface effects of a purloined letter to Alice's language and its resemblance with the 
language of a schizophrenic, Deleuze returns us back to his adventure with 
psychoanalysis. 
 
4. The Event and the Advent(ure) of Psychoanalysis: 
The “bad psychoanalysis,” as Deleuze describes in The Logic of Sense, observes 
materials that can be found everywhere and invents analogies creating false differences. 
If “the clinical psychiatric aspect and the literary critical aspect are botched 
simultaneously,” according to Deleuze, it is because psychoanalysis is satisfied with the 
account of the historical anecdotes and the designation of cases (1990: 92). Freud's 
realization of the constittutive nature of language rather than the content of the narrative 
account in a psychoanalytic treatment as early as the “Dora” case garners importance 
here since this realization locates the actualization of an event at the present time. The 
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transference of Dora's past tarumatic experiences to the analysis undermines the 
identification of a psychoanalytic event with the past. The event proves to be the sense 
created by the analyst and the analysand together. It is now not simply what happened to 
the analysand, but it is what touches and transforms both the analysand and the analyst. 
Therefore, Freud's discovery that during a psychoanalytic treatment “the productive 
powers of the neurosis” reproduce themselves in the form of “transferences” implies the 
dis-placement and re-placament of the subjects as the revitalization of the patient's 
phantasies and impulses results in the replacement of an earlier person by the analyst 
(Freud 1990: 43). An analysis, then, is exposed to the shifts in the series, each of which 
enables a change in the roles of the subjects although the scenes resemble each other, as 
in the two dialogues in “The Purloined Letter”.  This aspect of transference leads the 
signifiers and the signifieds to float so that there is no denotation, no direction, no 
designation, even no diagnosis. Therefore the present enters the scene taking place 
between the past events and the future recovery.  This 'taking place' ironically occurs in 
the form of dis-placements as a result of the compulsive repetition, which is an 
important component of repression. The tendency toward the pleasure principle, as 
Freud observes, is met by the resistance of the reality principle. The resistance implies 
both the insistence of unpleasurable experiences and attachment to life whose final 
outcome is expected to be pleasure. In other words, the reality principle does not totally 
abandon the intention of obtaining pleasure, but postpones satisfaction and carries into 
effect “the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to 
pleasure” (a.e., 6-7) . Similar to “the letter in sufferance” in “The Purloined Letter,” the 
pleasure of repression marks the analysis. Consequently, one can suggest that in a 
transferential situation, which is a form of repression for Freud, both the present time 
and the presence of the analyst are replaced by the past and someone who belongs to 
past. So long as the patient wants to preserve his / her pleasure any analysis will result 
in displacement.     
Freud‟s discovery and the ensuing change in the perception of psychoanalytic 
criticism, bring about a notion of psychoanalysis which is regarded as a narrative 
discipline in which incomplete, inconsistent, incoherent, and repetitive account becomes 
much more important than the contents of the past events. Whereas this new 
understanding possibly establishes an analogy between the author and the patient, 
Deleuze suggests, “authors, if they are great, are more like doctors than patients” (1990: 
237). That is why, Deleuze maintains, the psychoanalytic diagnosis about Lewis 
Carroll's Oedipal stage and its projection onto the little girl as a symbol of phallus is 
problematic. In short, for him, “artists are clinicians of civilization” (a.e.). This fact, 
nevertheless, does not suggest to Deleuze that all novels are created by the doctors. The 
novel as “a work of art” has an object, which is “to extract the non-actualizable part of 
the pure event from symptoms [. . .], to raise everyday actions and passions (like eating, 
shitting, loving, speaking, or dying) to their noematic attribute and their corresponding 
pure Event, to go from the physical surface on which symptoms are played out and 
actualizations decided to the metaphysical surface on which the pure event stands and is 
played out . . .” (a.e., 238)  The Logic of Sense, as a “psychological novel,” then, may be 
considered a pure event moving beyond its actualizable physical surface.  
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The telescope body of The Logic of Sense opens itself to an adventure both with 
Lewis Carroll and psychoanalysis. The “problematic” psychoanalytic readings of Alice's 
Adventures do not constitute a hindrance to the be-coming of an event here. Despite his 
critical stance of psychoanalysis, whose intensity increases in his later works, Deleuze 
does not leave aside his engagement with psychoanalysis. As Derrida suggests, it is 
indeed an advent(ture) that enables an event to happen. “Advent there must be,” he says, 
“because the event of an invention, its act of inaugural production, once recognized, 
legitimized, countersigned by a social consensus according to a system of conventions, 
must be valid for the future (a-venir)” (1988: 28). Implying a possibility of a future, a 
“coming” or an “invention,” the “advent” and the “event” mark the heterogeneity of the 
series. As a result, dramatizing a thinking process from which psychoanalysis cannot be 
excluded, Deleuze's thought comes in multiple voices. 
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